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THE LEGAL BENCHMARKS OF A PLAN FOR EMPLOYEES:
A NAVIGATIONAL FRAMEWORK UNDER SECTION 105
Section 105 of the Internal Revenue Code of 19541 provides three
vehicles by which an employer's payments of sick pay and other
1. (a) AMOUNTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO EMPLOYER CONTRmuTnoNs.-EXCept as other-
wise provided in this section, amounts received by an employee through accident,
or health insurance for personal injuries or sickness shall be included in gross in-
come to the extent such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the em-
ployer which were not includible in the gross income of the employee, or (2) are-
paid by the employer.
(b) AMouNTs EXPENDED rOR-MEDIcAL CARE.-Except in the case of amounts
attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relat-
ing to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross income does not
include amounts referred to in subsection (a) if such amounts are paid, directly or
indirectly, to the taxpayer to reimburse the .taayer for expenses incurred by him
for the medical care (as defined in section 213 (e)) of the taxpayer, his spouse, and
his dependents (as defined in section 152).
(C) PAYMENTS UNRELATED TO MSENCE FROM WoRK.-Gross income does not
include amounts referred to in subsection (a) to the extent such amounts-
(1) constitute payment for the permanent loss or loss of use. of a member
or function of the body, or the permanent disfigurement, of the taxpayer, his
spouse, or a dependent (as defined in section 152), and
(2) are computed with reference to the nature of the injury without regard
to the period the employee is absent from work.
(d) WAGE CONTINUATION PLANs.-Gross :income does not.include amounts re-
ferred to in subsection (a) if such amounts constitute wages or payments in lieu
of wages for a period- during which the employee is absent from work on account
of personal injuries or sickness; but this subsection shall not apply to the extent.
that such amounts exceed a weekly rate of $100. The preceding sentence shall not
apply to amounts attributable, to the first 30" calendar days in- such period, if -such
amounts are at a rate which exceeds 75 percent of the regular weekly rate of wages,'
2 of the employee (as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his 2
delegate). If amounts attributable to the- first 30 calendar days in such period are
at a rate which does not exceed 75 percent of the regular weekly rate bf wages of
the employed, the first sentence of this subsection (1) shall not apply to the extent
that such, amounts exceed a weekly rate of $75, and (2) shall not apply to amounts
attributable to the first 7 calendar days in such period'unless the employee is hos-
pitalized on account of personal injuries or sickness for at least'one day during such-7.
period. If such amounts are not paid on the basis of a weekly pay period, -the Sec- "
retary or his delegate shall b't regulations prescribe the method of determining the-.,
weekly rate at which such amounts are paid. . , ,
(e) ACCIDENT AND IEALTH PLANs-For purposes of this section and: section
104-
(1) amounts received under an accident or health plan for employees, and
(2) amounts received from a sickness and disability fund for eiployees
maintained under the law of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia,
shall be treated as amounts received through accident or health insurance.
(f) RULES FOR APPLICATION OF SECTION 213.-For purposes of section 213(a)
(relating to medical, dental, etc., expenses) amounts excluded from gross income
under subsection (c) or (d) shall not be considered as compensation (by insurance -.
or otherwise) for expenses paid for medical care.
(g) SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUAL NOT CONSIDERED AN EMPLOYEE.-For purposes
of this section, the term "employee" does not include an individual who is an em-
ployee within the meaning of section 401(c) (1) (relating to self-employed individ-
uals).
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medical benefits to employees will not be included in the recipient's
gross income. These include payments under a commercial in-
surance plan,' a state disability fund,3 and an employer-sponsored ac-
cident or health plan "for employees."' 4  This Comment will identify
the requisite elements of a health and accident plan, as well as the
criteria used in deciding whether or not the plan is "for employees."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 105. Section 105 considers three basic purposes which
may be the legitimate object of payments: (1) payments to compensate the em-
ployee for lost wages while sick, (2) payments to compensate the employee for the loss
of a function or member of his body, and (3) payments to compensate the employee
for medical expenses incurred for himself, his spouse, or his dependents.
In the case of wage continuation plans, the amount excludable from the recipient's
income is limited by complex rules. After the first thirty days of sickness, the employee
may simply exclude his sick pay not in excess of $100 per week. Excludability of pay-
ments received during the first thirty days of sickness, however, is subject to further con-
ditions. If the sick pay exceeds 75% of the employee's regular pay, no amount is de-
ductible for the first thirty days. If it does not exceed 75%, the employee may exclude
$75 per week for the last three weeks of the first month, but he may not exclude any-
thing for the first week unless he has been hospitalized for at least one day during the
period of the illness, in which case $75 is excluded in the first week. The following
chart may illustrate these limitations.
Amounts attributable
Ambunts attributable to the first after the first 30
30 days of sickness days of sickness
Sick pay
exceeds
75o of No exclusion allowed
regular
pay
Amounts paid
Amounts paid for for last 23 Maximum
first 7 days of days of sick- Exclusion
sickness ness 19$100
Sick pay perweek
does not
exceed If the employee is not
757 of hospitalized during the Maximumt
regular period of the ilnew, no Exclusion
pay 'exclusion Is allowed. is $75
I the employee Is per week
hospitalized, the maximum
allowable exclusion is $75
To exclude payments designed to compensate an employee for loss or loss of use of
a member or function of the taxpayer's body (or permanent disfigurement), the loss
must be permanent and may be computed with reference only to the nature of the injury
and not with regard to the period of the employee's absence.
2. Id. § 105(a). Although the statutory language does not use the word "commer-
cial," the legislative history of this section indicates that this would be the probable con-
struction, should the issue ever arise. See text accompanying notes 7-10 infra.
3. INT. RP. CoDE oF 1954, § 105(e) (2).
4. Id. § 105(e) (1).
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The lion's share of case law on health and accident plans has
arisen in the context of the closely-held corporation. 5 The close cor-
poration's plan, in contrast to the plan of the larger publicly-held
corporation, is more likely to fail because an attorney or accountant
is less frequently consulted. Moreover, the recipients under the plan
generally have an equity interest in the employer-corporation, a fac-
tor which casts doubt on the existence of the "for employees" require-
ment. While a superficial examination of the cases seems to suggest
the impermissibility of a plan compensating only employee-shareholders,
a more detailed reading reveals a reconcilable interpretation sanctioning
such plans.
I. TnE EXISTENCE OF A PLAN
Section 105's legislative history indicates that the purpose of the
"plan" requirement was to equalize the tax treatment between in-
sured and uninsured plans.6 Prior to the 1954 amendments, em-
ployer-funded plans were required to come within the definition of
"insurance" imposed by the 1939 Code.7  Contrariety of opinion
among the circuits produced a variety of standards for defining "in-
5. Of approximately nineteen cases dealing with these two issues, fourteen involved
close corporations: Estate of Chism, 322 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1963), affg 21 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 25 (1962); Barron v. United States, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 334 (W.D.
Pa. 1966); American Foundry, 59 T.C. 231 (1972); Samuel Levine, 50 T.C. 422
(1968); Alan B. Larkin, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), affd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968); Char-
lie Sturgill Motor Co., 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1336 (1973); Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972); Timothy L. Pickle, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1971);
E.B. Smith, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mer. 1065 (1970); Rosario Occhipinti, 28 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 978 (1969); Edward D. Smithback, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 709 (1969); Bogene,
Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968); Jack M. Burr, 25 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 592
(1966); Edward A. Bernstein, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 804 (1961). To date, the cases
dealing with publicly-held corporations are: Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp.
195 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Andress v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio 1961);
John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352 (1963); Estate of Kaufman, 35 T.C. 663 (1961), aff'd, 300
F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954). The report provides:
Under present law, amounts received as accident or health benefits are exempt
only if the benefits are paid under a contract of insurance. This results in substan-
tially different tax treatment to recipients of sickness and accident benefits who are
similarly situated except for the technical nature of the plan under which the bene-
fits are made available. Moreover, very troublesome legal and administrative prob-
lems have arisen in determining whether particular plans, especially self-insured
plans which are financed by employers without the use of a carrier or insurance
company, constitute insurance for purposes of the exemption.
Your committee's bill grants equal tax treatment to sickness and accident benefits
financed by employers whether paid under insured and noninsured plans.
Id.
7. Id.
1975]
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surance." The 1954 provision eliminated this insurance element;
however, the Congress explicitly stated that the "exemption is to be
granted only to benefits paid out under an arrangement which con-
stitutes a plan."9
The courts, affirming the Treasury's interpretation 10 of the "plan"
requirement, have identified three basic prerequisites for the existence
of a plan. First, there should be an articulation, prior to the occur-
rence of the illness," delineating the employer's proposed course of
conduct when presented with specified contingencies.' 2 Second, the
employer should make a commitment 3 to this articulation governing
payments, whether or not such commitment is legally enforceable.
Finally, the employees should be given notice'4 that, upon -the occur-
8. For discussion of the legislative background of section 105 at the time of the 1954
amendment, see Comment, What Is A "'Plan" Under Internal Revenue Code Section
105(d)?, 28 Omo ST. L.J. 483 (1967); Comment, Taxation of Employee Accident and
Health Plans Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 222 (1954).
9. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1954). In light of the absence
of legislative discussion, one can only speculate as to the motives behind the "plan" re-
quirement. Two reasons can be articulated in support of the "plan" requirement. The
first reason revolves around the notion that a prior corporate commitment to pay bene-
fits during periods of illness or injury gives employees a sense of security. Such security
is paid for partly by private enterprise and subsidized in part by the foregone taxes on
the medical benefits actually paid for and received by the employees. See text accom-
panying notes 70-75 infra. Secondly, the legislature may have feared that ad hoe pay-
ments would be difficult to distinguish from disguised dividends, if indeed such a dis-
tinction may exist outside the legal superstructure of the section itself.
10. Sections 104(a) (3) and 105(b), (c), and (d) exclude from gross income certain
amounts received through accident or health insurance. Section 105(e) provides
that for purposes of sections 104 and 105 amounts received through an acci-
dent or health plan for employees, and amounts received from a sickness and dis-
ability fund for employees maintained under the law of a State, a Territory, or the
District of Columbia, shall be treated as amounts received through accident or
health insurance. In general, an accident or health plan is an arrangement for the
payment of amounts to employees in the event of personal injuries or sickness. A
plan may cover one or more employees, and there may be different plans for differ-
ent employees or classes of employees. An accident or health plan may be either
insured or noninsured, and it is not necessary that the plan be in writing or that
the employee's rights to benefits under the plan be enforceable. However, if the
employee's rights are not enforceable, an amount will be deemed to be received un-
der a plan only if, on the date the employee became sick or injured, the employee
was covered by a plan (or a program, policy, or custom having the effect of a plan)
providing for the payment of amounts to the employee in the event of personal in-
juries or sickness, and notice or knowledge of such plan was reasonably available
to the employee. It is immaterial who makes payment of the benefits provided by
the plan. For example, payment may be made by the employer, a welfare fund,
a State sickness or disability benefits fund, an association of employers or employ-
ees, or by an insurance company.
Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 149-50.
11. See notes 41-46 infra and accompanying text.
12. See text accompanying notes 16-65 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 67-79 infra. The court in John C. Lang, 41 T.C.
352 (1963), stated:
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rence of certain injuries or illnesses, they will be reimbursed by the
employer. As will be demonstrated, there is an interplay between the
commitment and notice elements such that, where the commitment
element is present to the extent of a legally enforceable contract, the
notice element is not essential to the finding of a plan. 15
A. The Articulation Element
The Treasury Department has elaborated on the articulation re-
quirement by providing synonyms for the word "plan": "arrange-
ment" or "program, policy or custom having the effect of a plan."'16
A policy is usually some expression, either oral or written, of a con-
sciously desired future course of conduct.17  Custom, on the other
hand, is generally thought of as expressing a future course of conduct
through an unexpressed course of consistent past reactions to a given
set of stimuli.18 Hence, it would appear that the Treasury is permitting
not only expressions of future conduct, but also consistent prior actions
to satisfy the articulation element.
The primary value of the synonyms, however, is to illustrate that the
word "plan" will be liberally construed, rather than to give any concrete
meaning to the term. Of more definite value is Treasury recog-
nition that the plan need not be in writing, conceding that the mini-
mum level of articulation is an unrecorded custom of past payments
made on the occurrence of an employee's illness. 9
As we interpret the regulation, in order for there to be a plan, the employer must
commit himself to certain rules and regulations governing payment; these rules must
be made known to his employees as a definite policy ....
Id. at 355-56.
15. See notes 67-79 infra and accompanying text. This may be because notice is gen-
erally present in an enforceable contract or because of Treasury concern with problems
of proof.
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 149-50.
17. "Policy" is defined as:
5a: A definite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and
in the light of given conditions to guide and [usually] determine present and future
decisions. b(1): a specific decision or set of decisions designed to carry out such
a chosen course of action.
WESsmR's THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICnONARY 1754 (3d ed. 1961).
18. In comparison to "policy," very little formalism or articulation is involved with
the concept ascribed to "custom": "a form or course of action characteristically repeated
under like circumstances." Id. at 559.
19. Even the Tax Court was at first unwilling to concede so much. In John C. Lang,
41 T.C. 352 (1963), the court appeared to require the communication to employees of
a definite policy. Id. at 356. However, it was questionable that the "plan" in Lang
would even amount to a custom. Therein, the managers in the New York corporate
offices would decide on a case-by-case basis, without any established criteria, whether
1975]
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Before discussing the minimum articulation problems, it is appro-
priate to discuss a few basic considerations dealing with conventional
articulation-i.e., written or oral plans. In setting up a plan, the
first problem is knowing what to articulate. All heretofore acceptable
plans shared two features: first, the amount that the employer will pay,
and, second, the conditions that must exist before the payments win
be made.20 A simple statement that the company will pay all the
medical expenses incurred by employees for themselves, their spouses,
and their dependents would appear to be a sufficient articulation of a
medical reimbursement plan,21 although it is not suggested as a proper
one. This plan states the amount (all), the conditions (medical ex-
penses), and the persons for whom the expenses are incurred (employ-
ees, their spouses, and their dependents).
The conditions of the plan-that is, the events that will generate
benefit payments-need not be limited to the provisions of section
105(b), 22 (c)23 and (d),24 although only the amounts permissible
thereunder will be excludable from the employee's income.2 r For ex-
ample, the articulation may include payments for cosmetic surgery
although such amounts may be outside the definition of medical ex-
employees at the various branch offices would receive their wages or salaries during ill-
ness. Thus any adverse language requiring more than a custom would be dicta. Never-
theless, since Lang, the exclusion for payments pursuant to a "custom" has been upheld.
See text accompanying notes 41-64 infra.
20. See, e.g., Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Andress
v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio 1961); Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 217 (1972); Arthur R. Seidel, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1021 (1971); Bogene,
Inc., 27 OCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968).
21. Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1965). Although Nie-
kamp involved a plan established by custom, the court interpreted the custom to read:
'The company merely [pays] all employees who [are] ill full salary as long as they
[are] ill." Id. at 197.
22. Section 105 (b) provides for the exclusion from gross income of payments re-
ceived for "medical expenses" as defined in section 213.
23. Section 105(c) provides for the exclusion from gross income of payments designed
to compensate the taxpayer for the permanent loss of a member or function of his body.
24. Section 105(d) provides for the exclusion from gross income of sick pay to the
extent that, at maximum, it does not exceed $100 per week.
25. See, e.g., Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1965). In Nie-
kamp, the taxpayer was receiving $7,200 per year base salary plus a regular annual
bonus. Id. at 196. When he became ill, the company continued to pay his base salary
although only $5,200 per year was claimed ($100 per week times 52 weeks per year). Id.
The $7,200 per year benefits were limited by the provisions of subsection (d) which
limits the excludable salary to $100 per week in extended illnesses. The same
reasoning should apply to medical benefit payments that do not qualify as section 213
medical expenses. Accord, Andress v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio
1961).
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penses in section 21326 and, therefore, includible in the employee's
gross income. Other conditions may limit the payments to specific
types of medical expenses such as surgery costs or expenses relating
to heart attack treatment. Conditions may be stated which limit bene-
fits by allowing only a maximum per employee, per class of employee,
or per salary of employee. Very serious problems are raised when the
conditions attempt to limit the class of recipients, especially to share-
holder employees. Such classifications are likely to run afoul of the
statutory requirement that the plan be one "for employees.
'2 7
As to who must do the articulation, the case has not yet arisen
where the plan was denied because the wrong person or persons artic-
ulated the plan. On the other hand, all plans considered by the courts
to this date have been adopted by the authoritative body of the em-
ployer-e.g., the board of directors of a corporation.28
Aside from the "custom" plans discussed in greater detail below, the
plan may be articulated either orally or in writing.29 Of course,
a writing is preferable because it has evidentiary value for the taxpayer
who has the burden of proving the existence of the plan."° Never-
theless, it is clear that the board of directors may orally adopt a plan
without ever reducing the plan to writing.31 However, the oral dis-
cussion must not be merely an agreement to adopt a plan, but rather
must be an agreement that certain amounts will be paid to certain per-
sons on certain contingencies. Ambiguity in the oral discussion has been
26. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213.
27. See text accompanying notes 84-156 infra.
28. See, e.g., Arthur R. Seidel, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1021 (1971); E.B. Smith, 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970); Bogene, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968).
Note that no cases have dealt with this issue in the context of partnerships.
29. Treasury regulation section 1.105-5(a) provides, in part, that "it is not necessary
that the plan be in writing . . . " Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 Cum.
BULL. 149.
30. Section 7453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is the legislative authorization
to the Tax Court to prescribe procedural rules. Tax Court rule 142(a) establishes the
burden except for in limited circumstances not including section 105:
The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided
by statute or determined by the Court; and except that, in respect of any new mat-
ter, increases in deficiency, and affirmative defenses, pleaded in his answer, it shall
be upon the respondent.
In refund suits conducted on the district court level, the taxpayer is required to make
full payment of the assessed tax. See Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958), affd
on rehearing, 362 U.S. 145 (1960). Thus, in the suit to recover a refund, the taxpayer
is placed in the position of any plaintiff in a civil action being required to prove his
case by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422,
443 (1926).
31. See, e.g., Andress v, United States, 198 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
1975]
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held to be fatal.3"
Recording the board's, discussion in the minutes of the directors'
meetings provides a sufficient writing. In Alan B. Larkin,88 the
original plan was unwritten, the only written evidence of a plan being
a corporate resolution in the minutes "to continue the accident and
health plan for such employees that the officers at their discretion con-
sider should be covered."'8 4  Aside from managements retention of dis-
cretion and their failure to notify employees, it appears that the lack
of a properly defined original plan led the court to describe the plan
as "extremely tenuous." 35  Nevertheless, the court did not defeat the
taxpayer on the "plan" criteria. 6  In Bogene, Inc.,8 7 an oral reso-
lution, recorded in the corporate minutes, that "Bogene, Inc. shall
pay all medical expenses incurred by Mr. J. Bowman for himself,
his wife and his children for the year 1962 and henceforth"'8  was
sufficient. The court noted that "[i]t is clear that a 'plan,' as de-
fined in the regulations, existed . . ... "I Notwithstanding this lee-
way, the preferred method of evidencing the plan is to incorpo-
rate into the corporate minutes by reference a separate document en-
titled 'Medical Reimbursement Plan" or "Wage Continuation Plan."40
Such planning would permit a detailed tailoring of the plan to the
needs of the employees and the financial position of the employer.
With regard to the appropriate time for articulating the plan, regula-
tion section 1.105-5(a) requires that the plan be adopted prior to the
occurrence of any illness for which payment is made.41 Section 1.105-
32. In Arthur J. Seidel, 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1021, 1025 (1971), an agreement
to create a plan was held invalid. The statement should have been an articulation of
the plan itself.
33. 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
34. Id. at 631.
35. Id. at 633.
36. Id. at 635. Rather, the court found against the taxpayer on the "for employees"
issue. Id. (see text accompanying notes 118-22 infra).
37. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968).
38. Id. at 732.
39. Id. at 733.
40. The permissibility of incorporation by reference is indicated by the language of
the court in Bogene, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968), wherein the court com-
mented on the plan described in the minutes: "Although the plan was not in writing,
the resolution adopted by the Board of Directors was reported in the corporate minutes."
Id. at 733. See also O'Connel, Accident and Health Plans Offer Many Tax Bene.
fits: A Guide on Setting Them Up, Requirements, Rules, 2 TAXATION FOR AccouNTrArrs
54 (1967).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 149 provides in part:
[If the employee's rights are not enforceable, an amount will be deemed to be re-
[Vol. 8
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5(a) is no doubt justified by the statutory requirement that the payment
be made pursuant to a plan.42 This requirement has been recently af-
firmed by the Tax Court in American Foundry,43 invalidating a "plan"
to continue the salary of a corporate president because the measure
was passed after the president became ill.44  In Nathan Epstein,45 the
Tax Court placed strong emphasis on the fact that the participants
were in reasonably good health at the time the plan was adopted."
If no oral or written plan exists because of the absence of careful
forethought, a taxpayer might attempt to establish the existence of a
plan in the form of a "custom." A plan, however, is exposed to risks
when the degree of articulation devolves into this lower level of "cus-
tomary" payments. One risk is determining at what point a custom
has come into existence. This is crucial because payments prior to that
time will not be deemed pursuant to the "plan." This determination is
a function of the length of time that the "custom" has been in effect and
the number of times payments were made prior to the attacked pay-
ments.47 The first payments made are unsupported by a prior history
and are more likely to be included in the employee's gross income;
whereas, the exclusion of payments to employees subsequently ill is
based on the previous payments. The case authority delineating
when successive repetition of employer payments becomes a sufficient
custom to satisfy the articulation requirement leaves a gray area still
unchartered.
In Barron v. United States,48 for example, a wage continuation
plan was held to exist where there had been a "long standing and
unwritten policy or custom of continuing to pay the salary of a salaried
ceived under a plan only if, on the date the employee became sick or injured, the
employee was covered by a plan ....
(Emphasis added).
42. Section 105(e) (1) provides in part: "amounts received under an accident or
health plan ... " IN'r. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105(e) (1) (emphasis added).
43. 59 T.C. 231 (1972).
44. Id. at 239.
45. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972).
46. Id. at 221. In Timothy L. Pickle, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1971), the
court noted that "[t]o prevail, petitioner must establish not only that a valid wage con-
tinuation plan existed but also that the plan was in effect prior to his illness." Id. at
1302 (emphasis added).
47. Note that even where there has been only an oral articulation of the plan, this
risk is not as prevalent. For example, in Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217
(1972), the court noted that an oral adoption of the plan was sufficient; it did not ana-
lyze the amount and number of payments made. Id. at 220. An "oral" plan, however,
must be in operative language.
48. 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 334 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
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employee during absences from work because of illness." 49 No time
period was mentioned. A plan was similarly held to be sufficiently
articulated in Niekamp v. United States,5° wherein a steel warehousing
corporation had an unwritten custom or policy of "retaining the ser-
vice of elderly administrative and executive employees on the job as
long as they were able to work . . . [and] to pay all administrative
and executive personnel their full salary during periods of illness" 1
from 1925 to 1959-a period of thirty-four years. 2  In commenting
on the articulation element, the Niekamp court noted that "the com-
pany policy was clear, simple and not ambiguous. The company
merely paid all employees who were ill full salary as long as they
were M.' '13
In contrast, the Tax Court in Estate of Kaufman 5 4 held that a
wage continuation plan was insufficiently articulated by custom
where there was no evidence of any specific instance where payments
were made to previously sick employees, other than the taxpayer who,
before his stroke, was the managing officer of the business.5 Simi-
larly, in Rosario Occhipinti,55 the Tax Court held that the articulation
element was not satisfied:
There is no evidence that -the terms of [the taxpayer's] employment
arrangement entitled him to these benefits or, indeed, that any other
employee ever received such a benefit. The record shows merely
that [the taxpayer], an officer and major stockholder of the corpora-
tion, continued to receive his salary during his illness. 57
Hence, thirty-four years and substantial payments may satisfy the ar-
ticulation element, whereas a single payment will probably not be suf-
ficient to establish a "custom." This leaves fertile ground for advocacy,
but the very opportunity is indicative of someone's poor planning.58
49. Id. at 335.
50. 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
51. Id. at 197.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 35 T.C. 663 (1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1962).
55. Id. In Kaufman, the court found it significant that the only other instance of
"customary" payment under the alleged plan was to an employee after the decedent's
stroke. Id. at 667. This again points out the tax risk of being the first one sick under
such a plan. In Rosario Occhipinti, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 978, 982 (1969), the Tax
Court relied on the lack of evidence of prior payments to any other employee to defeat
the alleged "custom."
56. 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 978 (1969).
57. Id. at 982.
58. Cf. Edward A. Bernstein, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 804 (1961).
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For those "custom" plans already in operation, it is not too late to
correct the ambiguity by reducing the plan to writing and gaining its
retroactive effect. For example, in E. B. Smith,59 the corporation
began paying all the officer's medical expenses in 1963 on the advice
of an accountant. It was not until the last day in 1966 that a written
plan was adopted. The corporate resolution specifically provided for
a ratification of the prior payments. 60 The court held that a plan existed
for 1965 according to the terms of the resolution.61
An additional risk confronting the custom plan is the difficulty of
determining its scope with precision. For example, where the history
of payments reveals a reasonable relation to the productivity of the
employee, the expression and commitment of the employer may be lim-
ited to those payments that bear a similar relationship. Thus, any
payment that varies in size or purpose may not be established by cus-
tom.6 2  This appears to have been the suggestion of the Tax Court in
Chism Ice Cream Co.63  There, the employer had a history of seven
payments to employees; five were for less than $900 each, and the
other two totalled less than $5,000. By contrast, Mr. Chism's salary
of $120,000 was continued during the five year period of disability
preceding his death. The court held that the seven payments were in-
sufficient to establish a custom plan, but the real import was that even
if the plan existed, its scope would not have encompassed the dispro-
portionately large payments to Mr. Chism.
64
On the other hand, custom may complement a written plan
which would otherwise have failed. For example, in Bogene, Inc.,15
the plan was worded to cover Mr. Bowman, his wife and his chil-
59. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970).
60. Id. at 1066.
61. Id. at 1067; accord, Timothy L. Pickle, Jr., 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300, 1303
(1971) (holding that a board resolution, occurring two years after a sick pay custom-
type plan had been in existence, "merely put into writing a pre-existing plan"); cf. Char-
lie Sturgill Motor Co., 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1336, 1348 (1973).
62. This risk was directly encountered and overcome in Timothy L. Pickle, Jr., 30
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1300 (1971), wherein the custom-type plan had only been in effect
for less than two years and had only continued the salary of an employee at most for
five weeks prior to the permanent disability incurred by the president (also the 50%
shareholder). His salary was continued for 6 months at the full rate and at a reduced
rate thereafter. Id. at 1301. The court noted that, although the plan had never paid
out so much in its short two year history to an employee, the size of the payment to
the president did not negate the existence of the plan but rather was a factor in deter-
mining the amount deductible. Id. at 1302-03.
63. 21 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 25 (1962).
64. Id. at 29.
65. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968).
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dren, whereas Mr. Hochfelder's wife and children were not expressly
included. Nevertheless, the plan was construed to include Hochfelder's
family because the past payments to Hochfelder were on account of his
family's illness, thereby expanding the scope of the written plan by
custom.66
B. The Commitment and Notice Elements
The courts and the Treasury have recognized that the commit-
ment and notice requirements are interdependent.67  There is a trade-
off in the quantum of each that may exist. As will be shown, it may
be best to view these elements as in a state of dynamic equilibrium.
Specifically, the trade-off is between the requirements that the employer
commit himself to a course of action and that he give notice to the
employees receiving the benefit. The regulations do not interpret sec-
tion 105 as requiring a legally enforceable promise by the employer to
pay for certain employee's illnesses. 8  Hence, the degree to which the
employer is required to commit himself to the formulation of the plan
(the commitment element) is something less than a legally enforceable
contract. If the employee's rights are not legally enforceable, "an
amount will be deemed to be received under a plan only if, on the date
the employee became sick or injured, the employee was covered by a
plan. . . and notice or knowledge of such a plan was reasonably avail-
able to the employee."'
The regulations, establishing the interrelation between commitment
and notice, state two combinations of these elements that will pass mus-
ter. First, if there is a contractually valid commitment, no notice is
necessary. 70  Second, if there is less than a contractually valid commit-
ment, the notice element must be "reasonably available." Outside of
these two situations, the degree to which other combinations are ac-
ceptable will have to be defined by the courts.
Whereas the commitment element arises from a plain meaning inter-
pretation of the word "plan,"7 1 the notice elentent, imposed by the
66. Id. at 733.
67. See Barron v. United States, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 334 (W.D. Pa. 1966); Nie-
kamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo, 1965).
68. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 CuM. BuLL. 149 provides in part:
[lit is not necessary that the plan be in writing or that the employee's rights to
benefits under the plan be enforceable. However, if the employee's rights are not
enforceable, an amount will be deemed to be received under a plan only if . . .
notice or knowledge of such plan was reasonably available to the employee.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
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Treasury and reaffirmed by the courts, has a somewhat ambiguous ori-
gin and purpose. Ascertaining the purpose of the notice element is of
paramount importance if courts are to properly define the elements of
section 105 plans. Two reasons may be postulated for the imposition
of the notice requirement.
First, its purpose may be merely evidentiary. That is, although the
Treasury was willing to permit a less-than-legally enforceable (non-
contractual) commitment, it would not tolerate "secret" commitments
which come dangerously close to being no commitment at all. The
act of giving notice to the employees would serve as proof of the em-
ployer's commitment to the plan. Nevertheless, the Treasury recog-
nized that exclusion should not depend on the completion of the com-
munication process and proof would have been just as satisfactory if a
reasonable person could have acquired knowledge of the plan. There-
fore, the Treasury only required that knowledge of the plan be reason-
ably available to the employees covered.
Under this interpretation, the notice element has no significance in-
dependent of the commitment element and serves only as evidence of
the sufficiency of the employer's commitment.rs If this is the case, the
courts should develop criteria that emphasize the extent to which the
employer demonstrated a commitment to the plan and deemphasize
notification of the employees covered (although such attempted notifi-
cation might be taken into consideration). A history of appropriate
payments might satisfy this new test even though a sick employee is
totally surprised upon receipt of the check and even though there has
been no attempt to "advertise" the plan.
An alternative explanation for imposing the notice requirement is to
72. There is some doubt as to whether or not the Treasury is exceeding the scope
of its statutory duty by imposing evidentiary standards. Section 7805(a) provides the
general authorization to the Treasury:
iTIhe Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for
the enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary
by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue.
INT. REV. CoD OF 1954, § 7805(a). The prescription of legislative regulations would
be clearly within the bounds of the Treasury's statutory duty, as would be interpretative
regulations. However, it seems that the establishing of criteria by which some fact (here,
the commitment of the employer to make the payments) must be proved falls in the
borderline area of rules "needful. . .for the enforcement of this title." Id. Further-
more, the Code specifically provides that evidentiary matters are to be governed by es-
tablished rules of evidence existing in the United States District Court of the District
of Columbia. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7453. The same section specifically dis-
enfranchises the Tax Court from establishing rules of evidence, although it is given
the authority to establish other rules of practice and procedure. This would seem to
be an expression of legislative intent that matters of evidentiary standards are not within
the province of the Treasury.
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increase the employees' sense of security. The Treasury may have rec-
ognized a two-fold purpose of section 105 of the Code: first, to up-
grade the distribution of medical services, and, second, to impart a
sense of security to employees under such plans. 73 This latter objective
can best be met by requiring the employer to do his best to communi-
cate to his employees that they are covered by the plan. Under this in-
terpretation, the courts should develop criteria to measure the employer's
effort in communicating the plan. But if this is the proper interpreta-
tion, why not require actual knowledge? Probably because the employer
would be less reluctant to assume the risk of nondeductibility should the
communication be unsuccessful-an event outside of his control. Al-
though alternate avenues for deductibility may be possible,74 payments
pursuant to a medical benefit plan have been held expressly deductible
under section 162 and the regulations thereunder.
75
But if this second interpretation is the proper one, why dispense
with the notice requirement in the contractually binding plan? Inas-
much as expectancy (notice) is generally an integral part of legally
enforceable contracts, 76 it would be redundant to further require the
employee to have notice in the case of legally enforceable plans. The
regulations have demanded less than legal enforceability as the stan-
dard for the commitment element, while seemingly preserving one of
its by-products-the expectancy in the employees.
The specificity of the notice requirement will vary materially de-
pending upon the theory ultimately adopted by the courts. If the
73. John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352 (1963). While this is the court speaking, and not
the Treasury, it typifies the possible reasoning of the Treasury. This court, in defeating
a highly discretionary commitment to continue salaries during employee illnesses, noted
"'t]he 'general practice' of Aaron [the employer] offered no definite expectation to pe-
titioner or to any other employee that he would receive continued salary if he became
sick." Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
74. See notes 159-60 infra and accompanying text.
75. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 162 provides in part:
(a) In General--There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including . . . a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation
for personal services actually rendered ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958) provides in part:
Amounts paid or accrued within the taxable year for. . . sickness, accident, hos-
pitalization, medical expense . . . or similar benefit plan, are deductible under sec-
tion 162(a) if they are ordinary and necessary expenses of the trade or business.
76. Corbin summarizes his concept of the purpose of contract law as follows:
That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the law of con-
tracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by
the making of a promise.
1 CORBIN ON CoNTAcrs § 1 (1963).
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purpose of the notice requirement is "security," the courts should re-
quire a higher standard for judging the existence and satisfaction of
the notice element, perhaps even to the point of requiring actual
notice.77 On the other hand, if the purpose is "evidentiary," courts
should permit a less stringent standard for judging notice and
should allow alternate methods of proving the employer's commit-
ment to the plan.
Regardless of the elusive purpose behind the notice requirement, it
appears that, when notice is required, the notice need only be reasonably
directed toward employees eligible under the plan. Furthermore,
there is a tendency to require that their knowledge be more than an
unsubstantiated rumor; the employee should genuinely expect that in
case of illness the employer would make payments consistent with his
prior articulation.
79
From the fact that articulation and commitment are presented
herein as separate elements, it may be gathered that commitment is
something more than merely formulating and expressing an intent
to make payments related to an employee's personal injury or sickness.
For example, in John C. Lang,0 the employer had a "general practice"
of continuing the pay of salaried employees conditioned on approval
by a committee at the home office. Noting that the committee had no
pre-established criteria for awarding payments, the court rejected the
plan primarily because there was no prior commitment to the payment
of section 105 benefits.8' Rather, the discretion to make such pay-
77. In dicta, various courts have appeared to require actual notice. See Estate of
Chism, 322 F.2d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 1963) (stressed lack of formal notification); Nie-
kamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195, 197 (E.D. Mo. 1965); Jack M. Burr, 25 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 592, 603 (1966); John C. Lang, 41 T.C. 352, 356 (1963) ("these rules
must be made known to his employees"). But cf. Barron v. United States, 17 Am. Fed.
Tax R.2d 334 (W.D. Pa. 1966) (giving recognition to "availability" standard of notice
without citing authority); Nathan Epstein, 31 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 217, 220 (1972) (in-
terpreting the regulations directly to require that the members only have "reasonable no-
tice or knowledge that they are covered by the plan").
78. In Niekamp v. United States, 240 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Mo. 1965), the steel ware-
house company probably had several hundred employees, most of whom were probably
unaware of the plan. But inasmuch as the custom-established plan was designed to
cover administrative and executive personnel, it was only necessary that all the adminis-
trative and executive personnel had knowledge. Id. at 197.
79. Estate of Chism, 322 F.2d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 1963).
80. 41 T.C. 352 (1963).
81. Id. at 357. Note that the validity of the Larkin plan (see text accompanying
notes 33-36 supra) could have been decided on the lack of commitment element, but
because there appeared to be a semblance of commitment once the board of di-
rectors chose the employee, the court probably avoided the issue and decided the
1[975]
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ments had at all times been retained by the corporate management.8 2
Hence, the quantum of the commitment must at least be such as to re-
move from the corporation the discretion to make the benefit payment
after the injury has occurred. The existence of some standards of pay-
ment-some criteria-is essential. Nevertheless, this requirement should
not preclude subsequent review of claims. It seems reasonable that if
in articulating the plan the employer has classified only certain types
of injuries or illnesses as compensable, the employer should be allowed
to organize a committee to evaluate whether a claim is within the scope
of injuries or illnesses compensated under the plan.83
1. FOR EMPLOYEES
Not only must a health and accident plan exist, but it must also
be "for employees." Had the House version of section 105 passed, it
would have been necessary that the plan be non-discriminatory. 84
Basically, this would have precluded a health plan covering only lim-
ited groups of persons.85 However, the Senate Finance Committee pro-
posed that the non-discriminatory provision be eliminated:80
The qualification rules provided in the House bill have been elim-
inated. This was necessary because your committee, for reasons de-
veloped in the discussion on pensions, stock-bonus and profit-sharing
plans, abandoned the automatic qualification rules provided by the
House bill. Without these rules it would be necessary in most cases to
obtain specific rulings from the Internal Revenue Service in the case
of each employer sickness and accident plan, if the requirement had
case on the more egregious violation of the section-the "for employees" provision. 48
T.C. at 635. See also notes 118-22 infra and accompanying text.
82. 41 T.C. at 353. One persuasive piece of evidence contributing to the Tax Court's
determination that no established criteria existed was the fact that Lang's assistant
(Lang being the branch office sales manager of a machinery company), who assumed
Lang's full duties during the latter's three month absence, became ill as Lang was re-
covering. The committee at first refused to continue the assistant's pay, but at the con-
tinued beckoning of Lang, payments were made. Id. at 354. Thus while the two men
performed the same service for the corporation, only one would have benefited, absent
Lang's interference.
83. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
84. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(c) (1) (1954).
85. See H.R. RPs. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954). The plan was required
to meet the specific employee coverage, contribution, and benefits payable tests similar
to those currently noted in section 501 covering pension plans. The House version fur-
ther required legal enforceability such that any covered employee have a non-forfeitable
right to the benefits under the plan.
86. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954).
[Vol. 8
SECTION 105 PLANS
been kept that they must be qualified to receive the treatment de-
scribed above.81
This proposal was accepted by both the Senate and the Conference
Committee. This language provided powerful ammunition for sub-
sequent litigants arguing that a plan may discriminate in favor of
certain employees, such as shareholder-employees.8 8 Ultimately, the
Senate version did impose a restriction-the plan must be "for em-
ployees. 80
The Treasury Department has interpreted the "for employees" re-
quirement as permitting the plan to cover even a single employee: "A
plan may cover one or more employees, and there may be different
plans for different employees or classes of employees." 90 However, it is
decisional law that has given form to this requirement. The issue has
arisen mostly in the context of closely-held corporations which adopted
plans covering shareholders. Surprisingly, no cases on the subject
matter arose in the first thirteen years following the enactment of
section 105. By contrast, the last seven years has seen this phrase
seized upon by the Treasury to the doom of many health and acci-
dent benefit plans. 91
Basically, case authority has established that, in order to be "for
employees," the plan must have been created with the intent that the
designated participants, regardless of their equity interest in the cor-
poration, receive the benefits as a consequence of their relationship
to the corporation as employees and not as a consequence of some
other relationship to the corporation, e.g., as a shareholder or rela-
tive of one. The Tax Court in Alan B. Larkin9 2 established the criter-
ion for determining whether or not a plan is for employees: "The
touchstone of section 105(b) is that the genesis of a medical benefits
87. Id. at 16.
88. S'ee text accompanying notes 118-22 infra.
89. Halting the use of freely discriminatory plans, the Larkin court expressed the view
that:
The frequent use of the word "employee" in section 105 itself, and in the Commit-
tee reports, clearly reveals that the purpose of Congress in enacting the section was
to benefit employees as distinguished from other classes of persons.
48 T.C. at 633.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-5(a), T.D. 6722, 1964-1 CUM. BuLt_. 149-50.
91. See Charlie Sturgill Motor Co., 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1336 (1973); American
Foundry, 59 T.C. 231 (1972); Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972);
Arthur R. Seidel, 30 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 1021 (1971); E.B. Smith, 29 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1065 (1970); Edward D. Smithback, 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 709 (1969); Samuel
Levine, 50 T.C. 422 (1968); Bogene, Inc., 27 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968); Alan
B. Larkin, 48 T.C. 629 (1967), affd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
92. 48 T.C. 629 (1967), aff'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
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plan must be a purpose to benefit 'employees' as against other per-
sons or classes of persons. 95
Larkin, as the first case giving legal significance to the words
"for employees," has been consistently followed.94 The court's require-
ment of intent is the crucial common denominator upon which all the
decisions dealing with the "for employees" issue may be reconciled.
The key to analysis of cases will be the purpose of the drafters when
formulating the plan. The "intent facts"' 5 that have been cited by
cases to date are analyzed below. Recognizing that future cases
may satisfy this element with "intent facts" not heretofore em-
ployed,9" this analysis will be fruitful to planners in that they may
avoid the recognized dangers by structuring the transaction with facts
that have previously survived judicial scrutiny.
A. The Correlation Between the Asserted Benefit Received from the
Covered Employee-shareholder and the Omission from
the Plan of Similarly Useful Personnel
One primary test to determine whether or not the participants have
received the benefits as a consequence of their shareholder interest is
to note the reasons advanced to support the benefits. 97 Many plans
specify that the recipients contribute key management skills;98 in such
cases the court determines whether all persons similarly productive
to the corporation, key management in particular, are also covered
93. Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
94. For Larkin and its progeny on the "for employees" issue, see note 91 supra.
95. 48 T.C. at 635. The Larkin case refers to such facts as "indications of purpose."
Id. They will herein be referred to as "intent facts."
96. See, e.g., Samuel Levine, 50 T.C. 422 (1968). In Levine, Judge Raum, in some-
what of a "maverick" opinion, recognized the financially troubled corporation could not
have had the economic bad sense to have intended to tie the health of the company
to the health of its president. Theretofore, no such fact would have been expected to
defeat the plan on the issue of "for employees." Id. at 427.
97. Sometimes the court is willing to find certain implications regarding purpose
when the "plan" fails to so state. For example, in Bogene, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
730 (1968), the plan of a garment bag manufacturing corporation, owned by two 50%
shareholder-officers and employing approximately 50 lesser employees, was worded sim-
ply to pay all the medical expenses of the two officers. Id. at 733. The court assumed
"the underlying purpose of this plan was to provide extra medical benefits to the two
key management employees. . . ." Id.
98. See, e.g., Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972); E.B. Smith, 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970). For an example of a plan in which the motive for
payment was not expressly stated, but was implied by the parties and so construed by
the courts, see note 97 supra.
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by the plan.99 If -there is a high correlation between those within the
productivity group and those covered by the plan, it is an indication
that the drafters intended such persons to be compensated for their
productivity.'"0  A low correlation evinces a design to benefit the re-
cipients for a reason other than their asserted value to the corpora-
tion. Moreover, if there is a high correlation between the members of
the "underinclusive" plan and -the shareholders of the corporation, it
is further indication of the drafters' intent that the recipients receive
their benefits as a function of their equity interest in the corpora-
tion' 1-the common characteristic of a dividend.' 02
It is crucial to note that this intent fact by no means prevents a
plan covering only shareholding employees.' 0 3 The issue is purely fac-
tual: whether the intent was that the shareholder-employee receive
benefits because of his shareholder interest, or because of his uniquely
productive services to the corporation. 04 This distinction appears to
have been blurred by the Tax Court's decision in American Foundry;05
however, careful analysis reveals that the decision does not preclude
the shareholder-employee plan. In American Foundry, the corporate
employer, who was also the taxpayer, adopted a plan surreptitiously de-
signed to benefit one person who was both the president of the corpora-
tion and co-owner (with his wife) of the largest block of shares
(80%).10 6 The court recognized that although the president, Domenic,
made substantial contributions to the success of the company, his utility
99. For example, one factor that contributed to the failure of the Larkin plan was
the fact that the father of two 50% shareholder-brothers was paid $1,196 per year, rep-
resenting a relatively low level of productivity to the corporation. Nevertheless, under
the plan it appeared that he was entitled to the same benefits as his two sons, whereas
Pluznick, a valued non-shareholder employee receiving a substantially greater salary than
the father, was not entitled to free Blue Cross coverage. 48 T.C. at 633-34.
100. See text accompanying notes 110-17 infra. In Larkin, the court, while expound-
ing on the "for employee" issue, noted that "[t]here is no indication. . . that the pay-
ment of medical benefits was in any way related to the performance of services by em-
ployees of the corporation." 48 T.C. at 633.
101. See note 99 supra.
102. See, e.g., Chism Ice Cream Co., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 25, 31 (1962).
103. See text accompanying notes 121-22 infra.
104. See note 100 supra.
105. 59 T.C. 231 (1972).
106. Id. at 234. The plan was worded as follows: "Be it resolved: that officers...
to the extent not covered by existing insurance that medical expenses be payed by
the corporation. . . ." Id. Shortly before the adoption of the plan, the other ten offi-
cers of the corporation had purchased a group insurance policy. It was the understand-
ing that the plan was intended solely for the benefit of the president. The court inter-
preted the plan as a device to reimburse Domenic Meaglia for his medical expenses. Id.
at 242.
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was not significantly beyond that of other officers similarly situated.10 7
The court noted that "there were a number of other officer-employees
who also served the corporation in similar capacities, sometimes even
filling in for Domenic for extended periods, who were not covered by
the plan."' 08  Domenic's daughter had replaced him for extended
periods of time while he had been on vacation (prior to the occurrence
of his heart attack). The fact that Domenic was replaceable and had
been replaced on several occasions negated the establishment of the
requisite intent-that Domenic receive the benefits solely as a function
of his employment, and not of his stock interest.
American Foundry does not stand for the proposition that a plan
may not cover one employee who is also the sole shareholder. The
court will still look to -the relative productivity of that employee as
compared to the other employees' productivity as an indication that,
if similarly productive employees are omitted, there is or is not a
"rational basis" for distinguishing between them. Thus, American
Foundry is clearly consistent with previous cases upholding plans not-
withstanding the fact that the only employees covered were also share-
holders.' 0 9
In Nathan Epstein, the Tax Court held the corporation's plan to
pay all medical expenses of the four corporate officers and their
dependents to be "for employees" even though the plan did not cover
other non-officer employees and even though the four officers cov-
ered were the corporation's only shareholders."10 The asserted bene-
fit received by the corporation was the greater productivity an officer
of a corporation provides over non-officers."' Since the plan cov-
ered all corporate officers, there was a 100% correlation between the
the persons conferring the benefit to the corporation and ,the persons
covered by the plan. As the court noted:
The four officers composed a separate group within the Corpora-
tion with respect to duties as well as remuneration. Each was essen-
tially a buyer and seller of used machinery and each was a keyman
to the success of the Corporation. None of the other employees
served in such a position. It is our view that [the four officers] formed
107. Id. at 242.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972); E.B. Smith, 29
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970).
110. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 221.
111. Id.
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a class of employees which could be rationally segregated from the
other employees on a criterion other than being shareholders of the
Corporation.
112
In a similar situation, the Tax Court, in E.B. Smith," 3 held that
the plan was "for employees" where, of fourteen employees, the only
two employees covered were the officers of the corporation who were
the only shareholders. 14  Of the twelve excluded employees, only one,
a warehouseman, had been in the service of the corporation for more
than a year (three years). The longest service of the remaining
eleven employees was four months. 1 5 Again, the asserted benefit re-
ceived by the corporation from the covered officer-employees was
the utility of management services to the corporation. And once
again, the court recognized that there was a 100% correlation be-
tween the persons conferring the benefit (key management services)
and the persons covered by the plan. The Tax Court stated that
"[t]here were no other employees who performed duties that were
similar to those performed for the Corporation by the,. . . [two of-
ficers] but who were excluded from the plan.""" Thus, considering
the nature of the services of the non-covered employees, the class de-
noted as "officers" provided a natural basis to justify the exclusion of
less essential employees from the plan. 1
7
This intent fact presents the single greatest difficulty to the planner
whose objective is to select only shareholders. The problem arises
because the tax planner cannot "make" one employee less productive
than his shareholding comrade. However, through careful drafting,
one can accomplish coverage of shareholders by choosing a com-
mon denominator (e.g., key management, salesmanship, or manu-
facturing-organizational skills), which tends to select the shareholder-
employees to the exclusion of non-shareholder-employees.
All cases to date have dealt with corporate plans for "key manage-
ment." This amorphous term makes the employee's exceptional
productivity to the corporation the common denominator. This be-
ing theoretically reduceable to a revenue-generating capacity, the
plan's success depends on the extent of the "spread" between the
112. Id.
113. 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970).
114. Id. at 1067.
115. Id. at 1065-66.
116. Id. at 1067.
117. The Smith court used the phrase "natural category" to express this concept. Id.
Accord, Bogene, Inc., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968).
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dollars produced by the covered employees and that produced by
non-covered employees. However, if the drafters of the plan assert
as a benefit received some more specifically productive value than
"key management services," the test for the success of the plan would
be evaluated by comparing the spread between the dollars produced
by the covered employees within that specific aspect of the business
and the productivity of the non-covered employees in the same as-
pect of the business. For example, if -the plan was genuinely designed
to compensate Mr. Salesman (who is also the sole shareholder) for
being a good salesman, the success of the plan should depend on
whether there are other salesmen in the corporation who are similarly
"good," not on the fact that -the excluded manufacturing depart-
ment vice-president generates more revenue for the corporation. The
fact that Mr. Salesman was also the sole shareholder and president
of the corporation should not change the standards for decision-mak-
ing if the plan was genuinely intended to compensate him for the as-
serted specific productivity.
B. Equality of Treatment Between Shareholder Members
of -the Plan and Non-shareholder Members of the Plan
If a plan is designed -to compensate the participants as a conse-
quence of their employment and not their shareholder interest, both
shareholder and non-shareholder members should be treated equally.
Any inequality not reasonably related to the productivity of the mem-
ber may be fatal to the exclusion of benefits from gross income pur-
suant to section 105. For example, in Alan B. Larkin,"18 of the
plan's four covered employees, three were shareholders or relatives
of shareholders, and the fourth, Pluznick, was a highly valued em-
ployee who qualified under the provisions of the plan which included
"such employees that the officers at their discretion consider should
be covered."' n The corporation paid the premiums on the Blue
Cross Insurance for the three shareholder participants but failed to
make such premium payments for the fourth non-shareholder partici-
pant, Pluznick. This inequality between shareholders and non-
shareholders created a doubt significant enough to lead the court to
conclude that the plan was intended to benefit the participants solely
as a function of their equity interests, and not of their employment:
118. 48 T.C. 629 (1967), affd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
119. Id. at 631.
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We do think it significant in our search for purpose, however, that,
whereas Blue Cross payments were made throughout the period in
question for the benefit of the stockholders and their relatives, no such
payments were made for the benefit of [the non-shareholder, Pluznick].
This element . . . tends to negate the purpose to benefit employees .120
Larkin should not be interpreted as preventing the inequality of
treatment between shareholders and non-shareholder members of the
plan which may result from their disparate levels of productivity; in-
equality of treatment is only fatal if based on the equity interest of
certain members of the plan.121  Thus, a plan which limits the maxi-
mum medical benefits paid pursuant thereto to a fixed percentage of
the employee's salary in any one year or on the basis of the num-
ber of years the employee has served the corporation should lend
credence to the ultimate fact that the purpose of the plan was to bene-
fit the recipients as a function of their employment rather than their
shareholder interest. The faot that such a provision would naturally
tend to favor the shareholder-employees of the small corporation
should not bear on the success of the plan unless it is otherwise
shown that the limiting provision was specifically included with the
intent of selecting only shareholders.122  Otherwise the very inclusion
of such a provision would indicate that the genesis of the plan was
with the purpose of compensating for productivity and not for some
equity interest.
C. Relation of Benefits Received by Participants to
Their Equity Interest in the Corporation
Another indication that the plan was designed to benefit recipients
as a function of their employment and not as a function of some
other relationship to the corporation is the fact that the amounts re-
ceivable by the shareholder-participants are unrelated to their equity
interests. This intent fact is given greater significance where the only
120. The Larkin court was also persuaded by the fact that, while the plan covered
dependents of shareholders, no evidence was produced to show that Pluznick, the only
non-shareholder member, had dependents who were also covered. Id.
121. The Larkin case itself notes that equal coverage for differentially productive em-
ployees was an intent fact leading to the inclusion of payments in income. Presumably,
it would have been satisfied by the converse. Id.
122. Such an apparent intent contributed to the fatality of the Smithback plan,
wherein the sole proprietor was advised that he could effectively select himself by limit-
ing the benefits to "full time salaried employees." 28 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. at 710; see
notes 147-51 infra and accompanying text.
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employees covered are shareholders. In such a context, if the bene-
fit payments bear a direct proportional relationship to the recipient's
equity interest, it appears that the payments are in the nature of divi-
dends rather than sick-pay benefits.
Nathan Epstein2 ' serves as an illustration of this intent factor.
There, the corporation's four shareholders were the only employees
eligible to receive benefits under the plan.'2 4 One reason why the
court found the plan to be designed to benefit recipients as a conse-
quence of their employment relationship, in contradistinction to their
stockholder relationship, was that the plan covered all the officer-
shareholders equally, despite the fact that -the equity interests of the
recipients varied as follows: Irving, the father, owned 7Y%; Jo-
seph, the first son, owned 40%; Nathan, the second son, owned
27%2%; and Herbert, the third son, owned 25%.125 The court recog-
nized that the plan provided the greatest compensation to the father
because he was the eldest and thus most likely to need the benefits:
Although each was in good health at the time the plan was adopted, it
was only reasonable to assume that Irving Epstein, being the oldest,
might benefit the most from the plan. Irving held the smallest num-
ber of shares of any officer but received the largest amount of medical
benefit payments from the Corporation. 2
Thus, there was a disproportion between the amounts likely to be re-
ceived by the shareholder-participants and their equity interests.
The Tax Court in Arthur R. Seidel'27 further recognized that a
disproportion between the benefits likely to be received by sharehold-
er-participants and their shareholder interest negated the contention
that the plan was intended to benefit the recipients as a consequence
of their shareholder interests. In Seidel, a corporation adopted a
plan for its two 50% shareholder-employees after one of them had
suffered a severe heart attack and his daughter contracted polio.
128
The court noted that in light of these known illnesses, it was likely
that the sick shareholder would incur greater medical expenses than
the medically fit shareholder.' 29 As such, the plan would not be bene-
fiting the shareholders in proportion to their interest in the corpora-
tion:
123. 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217 (1972).
124. Id. at 218-19.
125. Id. at 218.
126. Id. at 221.
127. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1021 (1971).
128. Id. at 1022-23.
129. Id. at 1026.
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In view of Mr. Kirchmayer's prior heart attack and the illness of his
daughter, he and Mr. Seidel must have realized, when they adopted
the plan, that Mr. Kirchmayer was likely to derive substantially
greater benefits under the plan; hence, the adoption of the plan would
not provide benefits for them in proportion to their stockholdings in
the corporation. 130
Epstein and Seidel convincingly indicate that a plan limited to
shareholders must avoid tying the benefits to equity interests. For
example, a provision limiting the maximum payable to 10% of the
recipient's equity interest would ruin the taxpayer's chances for ex-
clusion. A history of actual payments that bore a close relation
to the equity employees' respective equity interests would be
perhaps less drastic, but probably similarly fatal. On the other hand,
where reasonably expected payments under the plan would accrue
more to one 50% shareholder than to the other, the disproportion is
indicative of an intent not to reward the recipient as a consequence of
his equity interest in the corporation.
D. The Capacity to Absorb Unlimited Medical Expenses
The likelihood of a corporation's decision to tie its financial suc-
cess to the health of its employees is another indicator of corporate
intent to benefit the recipients in their capacity as employees as op-
posed to their capacity as shareholders. For example, in Samuel Le-
vine,13 ' the taxpayer owned 83/96ths of the outstanding stock of
Selco, his corporation-employer, the balance being owned by his
two sons. Selco had only six to eight full-time employees. According
to -the corporate tax returns for the prior three years, it was netting
$300 to $1000 profit per year. The court held that a small, low-in-
come company could not have contended that a plan to continue in-
definitely the wage of a sick employee was in fact intended and de-
signed for the benefit of the eight non-shareholder employees as op-
posed to the three shareholder employees. 32 As the court noted:
[I]t is utterly incredible in view of its limited income and other
circumstances that it would have undertaken the comparatively stag-
gering financial burden of continuing to pay wages to its employees
over an indefinite extended period of years of illness. While it is true
that a bona fide plan for sick pay might have provided for a longer pe-
riod on behalf of the president than would have been adopted for other
130. Id.
131. 50 T.C. 422 (1968).
132. Id. at 427.
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employees, we do not believe that such period would have covered
so extended a span of years as is before us now if he were not the prin-
cipal stockholder and in fact the true owner of the business.
83
The basic premise underlying the court's conclusion was that it would
not have been a rational business decision for a financially struggling
corporation to make unlimited payments to all sick employees; there-
fore, the intent of the framers was not to compensate employees for
their productivity, but rather to compensate the president, because
he controlled the corporation.1
34
The Levine holding presents a serious problem for small corpora-
tions with financial difficulties. This problem may be overcome either
by showing a prior history of making extended payments, or more
easily, by limiting the payment of benefits to a percentage of the em-
ployee's salary or perhaps by paying benefits out of a fund contrib-
uted to by the employer only to a certain percentage of gross in-
come.1
3 5
E. Retention of the Discretionary Right to Make Payments
with the Intent to Favor Shareholders over the
Non-shareholder Members of the Plan
A corporation's retention of the power to favor certain employees
over others opens the possibility of favoring shareholder-employees
over employees not holding an equity interest. However, the mere re-
tention of such a power is not sufficient to defeat the plan inasmuch
as such a power is equally consistent with an intent to adapt the plan
to employees as their value to the company increases without hav-
ing to resort to a board meeting to vote on his inclusion. Neverthe-
less, when this retention of power is coupled with an intent to favor
shareholders over non-shareholder employees, it is reasonable to con-
clude that the "for employees" requirement has not been met.
133. Id.
134. It should be noted that the Levine plan limited sick pay continuation to $100
per week; however, the number of weeks was not limited. The court did not eliminate
the plan, but simply restructured it to be operative for a reasonable period of time. No
employee except the president received sick pay for more than a few weeks. The presi-
dent's illness had been continuing for five years as of the date of the opinion and was
likely to continue. Id. at 425.
135. Skolnick proposes either a fixed dollar limit or a percentage of the employee's
compensation. Skolnick, Employee-Stockholders Can Benefit from Medical Reimburse-
ment Plans, 50 TAXEs 595, 598 (1972).
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This intent fact is illustrated by the Larkin case.' 36 In Larkin, the
plan was designed to cover employees "that the officers at their dis-
cretion consider should be covered.' 13 7  The corporation's unwilling-
ness to commit itself to a firm course of action in regard to em-
ployees was an, indication that the corporation might have wanted
to favor shareholders over non-shareholder employees.' 38 However,
this fact may have equally indicated the officers' intention to retain
the discretion to benefit only those employees who proved productive
to the corporation. The court concluded against the existence of a
plan because there was oral testimony from an officer to show that it
was the intent of the drafters to favor shareholder participants over
non-shareholder participants:
Here the amounts to be paid and the circumstances under which they
were to be paid were decided on an ad hoc basis. Alan Lark-in, the
only witness, acknowledged that the employees were not informed di-
rectly even of the existence of the plan; further, that even if an em-
ployee were covered, he would not necessarily be paid for unusually
heavy medical bills. No limits were determined as to -time or amount. 13 9
F. Coverage of Non-employees
Another recent case on what constitutes "for employees" is Char-
lie Sturgill Motor Co.,40 wherein the corporation's plan included two
sons of Mr. and Mrs. Sturgill. The sons did not provide any employ-
ment-type services to the corporation, albeit they were nominally the
vice-president and treasurer of the corporation, respectively.' 4 ' The
plan adopted identified these sons by name and not as dependents or
relatives of the employee participants.14 2  This fact evinced a lack of
intent to pay benefits under the plan to the recipients as a consequence
of their relationship to the corporation as employees or relatives
thereof.'43 Failing to meet the requisite intent, the Sturgill plan was
held not to be "for employees."
136. 48 T.C. 629 (1967), afj'd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968).
137. Id. at 631.
138. This flexibility was distinguished in subsequent cases as being the reason for
holding otherwise where such flexibility was not present. See Bogene, Inc., 27 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 730 (1968). This appeared to give indirect support to the proposition
that the existence of flexibly administered plans would be fatal. As the text indicates,
such a conclusion is erroneous.
139. Alan B. Larkin, 394 F.2d 494, 495 (1st Cir. 1968), aff'g 48 T.C. 629 (1967).
140. 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1336 (1973).
141. Id. at 1346-49.
142. Id. at 1348-49.
143. Id. at 1349.
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Sturgill does not stand for the proposition that a plan may not
cover the spouse and dependents of the employee, at least under a
medical expense reimbursement plan as provided in section 105(b). 11"
To the contrary, the section specifically states that such -a plan may
reimburse the employee's medical expenses incurred for himself, his
spouse, and his dependents. However, the normal plan would at most
simply designate the employee's proper name and include -the spouse
and dependents by a general reference. The specific designation of
the Sturgill sons was merely an indication of the drafters' intent to
favor the recipients for reasons other than their employment relation
to the corporation. 14 5
G. Independent Advice
Most cases deciding the "for employee" requirement have noted
that -the plan germinated upon the suggestion of an accountant or
an attorney. 4 ' It would appear that such fact is probative of the
intent on the issue of whether the plan was designed to benefit the
recipients in their capacity as employees or in their capacity as share-
holders. The underlying, and often undiscussed, premise is that
if one is advised to act in a specified manner to accomplish certain
objectives, and he subsequently does act, it is likely he acted for the
prescribed motivation.
This factor was given heightened attention in Edward D. Smith-
back.1.47  Upon incorporation of Ed Smithback Plumbing, Inc., a
health plan was adopted pursuant to the suggestion of Edward Smith-
back's accountant and attorney that
144. See note 1 supra.
145. A common finding favorable to the existence of a shareholder-employee plan is
that each member be productive. See, e.g., Nathan Epstein, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
217 (1972); E.B. Smith, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970) (both Mr. and Mrs. Smith
devoted their full time to the business). Hence, the quantum of productivity may be
important to determine if the recipient is in fact an employee.
146. Charlie Sturgill Motor Co., 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1336, 1347 (1973); Nathan
Epstein, 31 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217, 219 (1972) (the accountant suggested the plan
as an alternative to increased compensation); E.B. Smith, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065,
1066 (1970) (accountant's advice was not determinative of existence of a plan "for em-
ployees," since such advice was merely an expression of the availability of the section
without strong evidence of the personal savings); Edward D. Smithback, 28 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 709, 710 (1969) (advice of attorney and accountant); Samuel Levine, 50 T.C.
422, 424 (1968) (president was told of section 105 benefits by an Internal Revenue
Agent who was sharing a hospital room with the taxpayer, who at the time was recover-
ing from a stroke); Bogene, Inc., 27 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. 730, 731 (1968) (advice of
accountants).
147. 28 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 709 (1969).
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[a]s a benefit of incorporating, Edward could reduce his income taxes
by having the company pay and deduct from its income -taxes Edward's
and his family's personal medical expenses, and that such payments
would be excludable from Edward's individual income. Edward was
advised that any plan for such payments could discriminate in effect
among employees by providing for payment only of the medical
expenses of the company's full-time salaried employees, of which
Edward would be the only one, and that the plan did not have to be in
writing.
148
As a consequence of this advice, the court concluded that the pur-
pose of the plan was for Mr. Smithback to avoid the personal income
taxes on the benefits received.14 9 The court concluded that the plan
was designed to benefit Mr. Smithback in his capacity as the owner
of the business rather than as an employee:
[W]e are persuaded the purport of the plan was to benefit Edward as
owner of his plumbing business and as the sole stockholder of the cor-
porate business. We understand the genesis and the primary purpose
of the plan-indeed, of the incorporation of Edward's business-to
have been the avoidance of Federal -taxation, a purpose which obvi-
ously was to benefit Edward in his capacity as owner of the business
rather than as employee. The plan did not confer any health or
medical benefits upon Edward as employee.150
Thus, proof of the requisite intent may be evidenced by the state of
mind of the framer of the plan in seeking and receiving advice from
an accountant or an attorney.
It should be noted, however, that the Smithback case does not
stand for the proposition that the adopters of the plan may not be
motivated by a desire to realize the favorable tax consequences. In
Arthur R. Seidel,'5' a corporation performing services as representa-
tives of electrical manufacturers through its -two sole employees (who
were also 50% shareholders), adopted a health plan one year after
receiving a brochure published by a certified public accountant enti-
tled How to Get "Free" Medical Care-Or At Least Reasonable!152 As
the title indicates, the brochure described how shareholders of closely-
held corporations may receive the tax benefits of section 105. In
holding that the plan was nonetheless "for employees," 53 the court
148. Id. at 710.
149. Id. at 711.
150. Id.
151. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1021 (1971).
152. Id. at 1022-23.
153. Id. at 1026.
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noted that the existence of an intent on the part of the framers to
receive the tax benefits provided in section 105 was insufficient in
itself to negate a coexisting intent that the recipients under the plan
be benefited solely as a function of their employment relationship to
the corporation:
It may be that when [the two fifty-percent shareholders], as the di-
rectors of the corporation, adopted the several employee benefit plans
in 1966, they were in part motivated by a realization of the tax bene-
fits that could be derived from the establishment of such plans; yet,
the existence of such a motivation does not justify our holding the plan
invalid. If a plan within the meaning of section 105 was adopted, then
they are entitled to the tax treatment provided by law for the benefits
paid under such a plan.'5
The Seidel and Smithback decisions may be reconciled and dis-
tinguished by the degree to which -the tax incentive was a significant
motivational force. In Smithback, it appears that the plan was spe-
cifically limited to the company's full-time salaried employees be-
cause Mr. Smithback himself would be the only such employee. The
plan was also adopted at the same time he incorporated his sole pro-
prietorship for the express purpose of limiting liability and saving
income taxes.155 Despite the fact that he was the only full-time sal-
aried employee and of such utility to the corporation to qualify as a
natural category to justify the exclusion of the other -three employees
from the benefits under the plan, there was simply no evidence to in-
dicate that the plan was adopted with the intent -that he receive the
benefits as an employee. The saving on his own personal income
taxes appears to have been his sole objective, indicating that the plan
was not adopted with the intent of benefiting himself in the capacity of
an employee.
In Seidel, however, the mere recognition that the two 50% share-
holders, as sole employees, were likely to receive benefits under the
plan in disproportion to their shareholder interests'50 was sufficient
evidence of an intent that the plan benefit the participants as employ-
ees, and not as shareholders. The existence of this intent fact alone
was sufficient to dissipate any contention that the personal tax bene-
fits indicated an intent to benefit them as shareholders. It is likely that
the use of the "tax saving" purpose as an intent fact will be limited.
It would indeed be an incredible contention that, as its underlying
154. Id.
155. 28 CCH Tax CtL Mem. at 710.
156. See text accompanying notes 151-54 supra.
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premise suggests, the mere recognition of the tax benefit would pre-
vent its very operation.
III. DEDUCTIBILITY OF EMPLOYER BENEFIT PAYMENTS
It has long been believed that a plan had to meet the tests of
section 105 of "plan for employees" before payments thereunder
would be deductible by the business entity.15 7  This has perhaps been
caused by -the Treasury regulation which provides that payments un-
der certain benefit plans may be deducted as a business expense if
"ordinary and necessary."'158 However, recent cases have established
that if reasonable, the corporate payment may be deductible as com-
pensation even if the plan fails.'59 The Commissioner has quickly
conceded the rationale of the point.'6 0
Hence, if the plan fails to qualify because of the "for employee"
limitation, the alternate test for deductibility becomes the "reason-
ableness" of the payments.' 6" In the determination of "reasonable
compensation," both American Foundry and Sturgill place primary em-
phasis on the relationship between the total value of compensation re-
ceived-salary plus the value of any other fringe benefits includ-
ing the health plan-and the services performed by the employee
for the corporation.1 2 As the court noted in American Foundry,
the health plan was the only fringe benefit given to Domenic,
157. Alan B. Larkin, 48 T.C. 629, 635 (1967), affd, 394 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1968)
(on failure of the plan, the amounts paid pursuant thereto were not deductible by the
corporation); E.B. Smith, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1065 (1970); cf. Nathan Epstein, 31
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 217, 220 n.4 (1972). In a factual situation that tested the converse
proposition because the plan was held to qualify under section 105, the court stated: "A
necessary corollary of section 105 is that if the payments are excludable from the gross
income of the employee because they are made under a 'plan for employees,' the corpo-
ration is entitled to a deduction for such payments under section 162(a)." Bogene, Inc.,
27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 730, 734 (1968) (footnote omitted). This relatively early case
suggested an equality between a section 105 plan and corporate deductibility such that
a nonqualifying plan for the employee meant non-deductibility for the corporation.
158. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10(a) (1958).
159. Charlie Sturgill Motor Co., 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1336, 1349 (1973); Ameri-
can Foundry, 59 T.C. 231, 243-45 (1972).
160. 1974 INT. REv. BuLl.. No. 14, at 7.
161. Note that the same result might not be reached if the "plan" fails for lack of
articulation, commitment, or notice. The apparent condition precedent, other than "rea-
sonableness," to the corporate deductibility as compensation is a contractual relation be-
tween the corporation and the employee. American Foundry, 59 T.C. 231, 243 (1972).
However, as American Foundry indicates, the contractual relation for the fringe benefits
will probably exist where the employee has mere knowledge of the benefit plan. Id.
at 243-44.
162. See note 159 supra.
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and a salary "of $23,082.00 coupled with an agreement of em-
ployer-paid medical expenses was not excessive compensation to Dom-
enic Meaglia.9'
63
In determining the value of a health and accident plan, the
American Foundry court affirmed regulation section 1.162-7(b) which
states that the circumstances to be considered in determining rea-
sonableness "are those existing at the date when the contract for
services was made, not those existing at the date when the contract is
questioned." '164 Thus, the American Foundry court noted that Dom-
enic at the time of the adoption of the plan was in good health, with
nothing in his past medical history to indicate that he would suffer
such a long and serious illness.
165
Beyond what has already been stated, whether or not a health plan
constitutes reasonable or excessive compensation becomes a question
of advocacy based upon a sophisticated analysis of facts. It is suffi-
cient to note that, for the purposes of this Comment, an alternative
avenue for employer deductibility exists if the plan does not qualify
under section 105.
IV. CONCLUSION
The validity of section 105 plans frequently hinges upon the presence
of four main elements: an articulation of the conditions upon which
payment will be made, a demonstrated commitment to the articulation,
a reasonable attempt to impart notice of the plan, and a requisite intent
that the benefits be paid as a consequence of employment services. A
writing is the safest method of creating a plan because it can reflect
the presence of these elements; however, as has been indicated, section
105 plans may also be formed orally or through custom. Nevertheless,
a consuetudinal plan is subject to the inherent weakness of requiring
a prior history of payments, the absence of which would leave the scope
undefined and may threaten the very existence of the plan.
The paucity of case law or legislative illumination in two areas is
likely to engender litigation in the future. First, inasmuch as the pur-
pose behind the notice requirement has not been precisely defined, ad-
vocates on both sides of the tax bar can be expected to seek an input
while the subject is still malleable. Second, where a plan fails because
it is not deemed to be for employees, what happens to the legitimately
163. 59 T.C. at 240-41.
164. Id. at 244.
165. Id. at 238-39.
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compensated employees? A court addressing this issue could conclude
that a plan which compensated both employees and ineligible share-
holders had a two-fold and severable motive: to compensate em-
ployees for their employment relationship and to compensate share-
holders for their equity relationship. Under such a hybrid plan, to the
extent that payments were received under the employees' portion, ex-
cludability would be allowed. Conversely, to the extent they were re-
ceived under the improper portion, excludability would be denied.
Section 105 plans provide an attractive vehicle for employers to con-
fer tax-free benefits on their employees. But the draftsman should not
be misled by the deceptive simplicity of section 105 requirements.
While apparently uncomplicated, these plans require careful fore-
thought, especially where the employer misconstrues section 105 as a
device whose principal attractiveness is the ability to benefit share-
holder-employees.
Bruce M. Boogaard
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